UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
 
 S U M M A R Y O R D E R
 
 
THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER AND
MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT,
BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY OTHER COURT IN A
SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR
PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.
 
 At a stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United
States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of February 
two thousand.
 
 
Present: HONORABLE AMALYA L. KEARSE,
 
 HONORABLE JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 
 HONORABLE ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
 
 Circuit Judges.
 
_____________________________________________________
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
 Plaintiff-Appellee,
 
 - v. -  No. 99-6242
 
JERICO PRECISION MANUFACTURING CORP., also known as JP
Manufacturing Co.,
 Defendant-Cross-Claimant,
 
JOHN PIMENTEL,
 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-
 Appellant,
 
DUROYD MANUFACTURING CO., INC.,
 Defendant-Cross-Defendant.
_____________________________________________________
 
 
  Appearing for Appellant: John Pimentel pro se, New Rochelle, N.Y.
 
 Appearing for Appellee: Jonathan A. Willens, Ass't U.S. Att'y, SDNY, N.Y., N.Y.
 
 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
 
 This cause came on to be heard on the record from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, and was argued by appellant pro se and by counsel for appellee.
 
 ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the
judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed.
 
 Plaintiff pro se John Pimentel, who was represented by counsel at the initial stages of this action,
appeals from a judgment entered following a bench trial in the Southern District of New York, awarding
plaintiff United States $640,983.72 in damages and statutory penalties under the False Claims Act, 31
U.S.C.  3729 et seq. On appeal, Pimentel contends principally that he was improperly denied a jury trial,
and that he was denied a fair bench trial because the trial judge several times fell asleep. For the reasons
that follow, we find no basis for reversal.
 
 Pimentel was not entitled to a jury trial because he did not make a timely demand for such a trial. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b) (demand must be made no later than 10 days after service of the last pleading
directed to the issue on which jury trial is sought). Pimentel made no such demand until 20 days after he
filed his answer to the complaint. The demand was made in an amended answer which introduced no new
issues but merely added the jury demand, and hence did not comply with Rule 38(b). Although the district
court would perhaps have had discretion to excuse the untimeliness, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b), the record
does not reveal that Pimentel's then-attorney offered any explanation for the failure to make a timely
demand.
 
 As to Pimentel's contention that the trial judge intermittently slept during trial, the record is silent. 
The government, although arguing that the judge was alert and actively participated in the trial, apparently
concedes that he may have fallen asleep on occasion. Even if that occurred, however, it is not a basis for
reversal if it did not cause Pimentel prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1289 (5th
Cir. 1979).
 
 Pimentel contends that he was disadvantaged because while he was questioning witness Neil I.
Hanrahan about a "DAR"--an acronym for Defense Acquisition Regulation--the judge slept, awoke,
thought the question was about "'BAR'" (Pimentel brief on appeal at 2 (capitalization in brief)), and
foreclosed further questioning. The record, however, does not support this contention; rather it makes clear
that the court understood that Pimentel was asking about the DAR and simply ruled that Hanrahan's
knowledge of the regulation was irrelevant:
 
 Q. [by Pimentel] Are you familiar with Defense Acquisition Regulation 3-
 11, record of price negotiation, as you call it?
 THE COURT: I don't care whether he is or not.
 Next question.
 MR. PIMENTEL: May I read part of this?
 THE COURT: No.
 MR. PIMENTEL: I want to place this DAR into evidence then.
 THE COURT: What?
 MR. PIMENTEL: As a defense exhibit.
 MR. WILLENS [for the government]: Your Honor, if he wants to mark it
 for identification, that's all right, but it's not appropriate evidence. It's not identified
 and it's not relevant.
  THE COURT: He can mark anything for identification.
 . . . .
 Q. Mr. Hanrahan, are you aware of any government regulation--
 THE COURT: Look, I am not concerned with his awareness of regulations.
 BY MR. PIMENTEL:
 Q. All right, Mr. Hanrahan. Is there--can I ask it that way? Is there a
 regulation?
 THE COURT: Excluded. I'm not concerned whether he knows it or not.
 MR. PIMENTEL: I want to put on the record an objection to this, your
 Honor.
 THE COURT: You can put on the record--
 MR. PIMENTEL: The DARs are being used by the U.S. Government in
 their statement of damages, and I should be able to use it in my defense.
 THE COURT: You can't ask him whether he was aware of regulations.
 MR. PIMENTEL: Your Honor, he just said that he has to follow the
 guidelines, he has to follow the regulations.
 THE COURT: We are not here examining him for the bar association.
 . . . .
  THE COURT: I'm not concerned with his knowledge of the regulations. 
 Now get on with something else.
 
(Trial Transcript at 321-22.) Thus, in the colloquy relied on by Pimentel, not only the "DAR" acronym
but also the full term "Defense Acquisition Regulation" was mentioned; and the context of the "bar"
reference, which is the sole evidence cited by Pimentel to support his allegation of somnolent confusion,
makes clear that the court was fully cognizant of the proceedings and pointedly refused to allow Pimentel
to explore the witness's knowledge of law.
 
 Nor do we see any other basis on which to conclude that Pimentel was prejudiced by the trial
proceedings. Several issues, such as whether the Army contract in question was procured by fraud, were
properly foreclosed by Pimentel's prior conviction for making false statements to the government in his
bid for the contract. We see no error in the court's application of the law and no clear error in its factual
findings after trial.
 
 We have considered all of Pimentel's contentions on this appeal and have found in them no basis
for reversal. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.